Leon Panetta’s disclosure, for reasons best
known to him, that Pakistan Army was planning an operation in Waziristan,
followed by General Kayani’s 14 August speech in which he, probably for the
first time, openly acknowledged that ‘war on terror’ is also Pakistan’s war,
has stirred debate on likely military operation in North Waziristan and its
implications thereof. After going through various articles on the subject, one
gets the impression that only the military establishment is responsible for the
present mess and it is time to redeem. While this argument may carry some
weight, the issue is much more complicated for easy understanding.
Let me first start with the public perception
which emanates from the belief that Pakistan is ‘an ideological state’ and
since the Islamic concept of nationalism advocates
the concept of ‘ummah’, majority of the masses, especially in the rural areas, who remain under
the influence of religious clergy, consider Taliban’s struggle as legitimate.
They fail to comprehend as to why ‘Mujahideen’ of
yester years are now called ‘terrorists’. To date, neither the media nor the politicians
have picked up the courage to change this mind-set and educate the masses.
Despite
being a pluralist organization, the intake in military comes from the same
background, Islam is still a major motivation and soldiers need to be convinced
that the operations they undertake against their own people, or perceived to be
such, are justified.
In such
environment, General Kayani’s remarks on 14 August that ‘war on terror is also
our war’ must be appreciated as a bold step, setting right direction for the
Army, if not for the nation. However, these remarks in no way imply that the
military would undertake operation in North Waziristan on USA’s dictation. In
my view, certain considerations would dictate whether the operation should be
undertaken or not and if the decision is in affirmative, certain pre-requisites
must be met before embarking on this venture.
Considerations; (1) Is the Pakistani public in
favor of such an operation? (2) In spite of the general perception in Pakistan
that foreign forces are presently occupying Afghanistan, the worldwide view is
that they are UN mandated and supported by a
legitimate Afghan government. That be the case, are local militants within
their right to undertake terrorist activities in Afghanistan? (3) If the local Taliban do
not accept Pakistan Government’s writ and go across to Afghanistan to hit the NATO/Afghan
forces, how should the Pakistan Government respond to any counter action by them?
Should we put our country at stake for those who do not even accept
government’s writ? (4) A friendly and stable Afghanistan is surely in
Pakistan’s interest. This being the objective, are the local militants part of
the solution or part of the problem? (5) Notwithstanding emotional outbursts
which some of our leaders display, is the nation prepared to face the
consequences of local militants’ continued declared interference into the
internal affairs of Afghanistan? If not, how to stop them? (6) Negative
international perception about Pakistan with regard to ongoing militancy. (7)
And finally, internal fall out of any such operation and its ramifications.
If as a conclusion to above considerations, an operation
is deemed necessary, the same be undertaken after meeting certain
pre-requisites, especially in view of our past experiences. While considering
the external factor, we must never forget that in the
eighties, Pakistan fought along-side USA and together we were instrumental in
ousting the Soviets from Afghanistan. After achieving their objectives,
however, USA left us in the lurch to face the consequences. Similarly, not very
long time back, our forces undertook operations in Swat and South Waziristan
and since the border on Afghan side was not sealed, the terrorists not only
went across but since then are conducting terrorist activities against Pakistan,
with impunity, from their safe-havens in Afghanistan, if not under the
patronage of NATO/Afghan forces but certainly from areas presently controlled
by them.
In this backdrop, it would be natural for the
Pakistani leadership to be apprehensive about USA’s intent behind compelling us
to undertake operation in North Waziristan. We must never preclude the possibility
that the USA only wants us to attack the militants so that the weakened
militants could be pressurized by them into negotiations for extracting a
better deal, which may not be in Pakistan’s best interests. Besides, the
backlash, if also sponsored by hostile intelligence agencies, would be
crippling for Pakistan. As such, Pakistan Army must not undertake this operation
unless the border across is sealed by ISAF/US forces and guarantees are given
that the retreating militants would not be given safe passage to be used
against Pakistan in the future. Also, Pakistan must be included as a party in
any future negotiations, overt or covert, with the Taliban.
Internally, the experience shows that successful
military operations in Swat and South Waziristan were not backed by the
required political process for seeking permanent solution. The Army still is
deployed and committed in these areas. As such, any future military operation
must be preceded by shaping of environment for which the political leadership must take full ownership and
media should be effectively used to educate the masses. Well planned covert
operations must be undertaken to isolate the militants from the locals, though
a difficult proposition till the time locals carry the impression that
militants are waging ‘jihad’ against foreign forces in Afghanistan. Speedy
rehabilitation and initiation of political process after successful military
operation are imperatives for a permanent solution, which must be planned in
advance. The political leadership must also be fully prepared to deal with any
internal fall out of such an operation.
And finally,
in the prevailing regional environment, sincerity of purpose is of prime
essence. Both Pakistan and USA must learn from the past mistakes, recognize the
threat in its larger context, formulate a comprehensive threat response and
then appropriately deal with the rogue elements. Double games by USA or
Pakistan or both have neither served their interests in the past nor they would
in the future – threat is too grave to play around.
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