Too much excitement, too soon (My article published in THE NEWS on 27 October 2012)

Verdict on Asghar Khan case has stirred storm in a tea cup. Apparently, PPP is sensing a kill, PML (N) is on the defensive and a few anchor-persons known for their anti-establishment stance, for different reasons, are considering it an opportunity to further their agenda. In my reckoning, there is too much excitement, too soon as little is going to come out of the decision which will only be used for gaining political mileage, resulting into greater acrimony among the political parties.

For many, it’s a landmark decision as for the first time in the history of this country, the former chiefs of the Army and ISI have been directly implicated for distributing public money amongst certain politicians. The missing link, however, is why did they do it? Had they some personal agenda or was it an institutional undertaking? If the amount was distributed among the anti-BB politicians, what were the reasons for stopping BB from reaching the corridors of power.

In this regard, Lieutenant General (R) Hamid Gul has often admitted that he was instrumental in making IJI and has been challenging the judiciary to summon him for explaining his reasons for doing so. The bench dealing with the Asghar Khan case did not summon him but in case of trial of the former chiefs of Army and ISI, I am sure Lieutenant General (R) Hamid Gul would be called as the first witness and, going by the confidence he displays, I am sure he would have many revelations to make, which may not only hurt PPP badly but also spoil its relations with the military establishment. So, to me, trial of the generals would do more harm than good for the country.

Another aspect of the verdict that may cause uncertainty is that while the confessions of those who distributed money were considered good enough to implicate them, their same testimony is not good enough to implicate those who took the money. If tomorrow it is not proved that the supposed receivers took the money, what would happen to those who admit distributing the money. It is just as if a person confesses to committing a murder but would we declare him a murderer if the victim is still alive.

The third aspect of the verdict relates to the president's political activities. In all likelihood, President Zardari is not going to shun his political activities, will continue to be the de-facto head and lead the party, especially in view of the forthcoming elections. As such, we may be heading for yet another tussle between the President and Judiciary.

Thus, I see fewer chances of any convictions, but greater polarization.

The timing of the announcement of short order is yet another aspect which, I feel, could have been deliberated. We know that these days a consensus was being developed successfully against the militants after the Malala incident and the verdict has totally diverted public attention, indirectly benefiting the militants. Could it have been delayed for a few days for a better cause?

The outcome also raises an important question; is it a pre-cursor to opening other such cases? Pakistan’s history is full of betrayals, treachery and unconstitutional undertakings by the military establishment, Judiciary and the politicians. As a practice, whenever the military took-over power, the Judiciary mostly validated the act and the politicians in the opposition welcomed it. Was not the last military take-over by Musharraf validated by Judiciary, with the present CJ as part of the bench, and BB supported the coup? He was even given unprecedented powers to amend the constitution by the court. Can the country, already in the doldrums, afford to dig all the previous such cases and punish the perpetrators?

Already, NRO case has wasted over four years with no meaningful outcome from public perspective, now we are embroiled in controversy over Asghar Khan case verdict and more cases are in the offing, starting with proceedings on the memo-gate commission.

While the judicial process may take its course, can we afford the polarization unnecessarily generated as an outcome of decisions, especially when already facing existential threat from militancy and extremism – a point for our Judiciary, politicians and anchor-persons to ponder? To put it simply; do we want to live in the past or ready to move on? 

Are we ready to fight or succumb to extremism (My article published in THE NEWS on 22 October 2012)

Pakistan, today, stands isolated internationally, weakened internally and faces a serious existential threat from militancy, brewed within, as well as, externally sponsored. Unfortunately, the nation seems to be divided on the issue; some feel that militancy must be ruthlessly rooted out from our society using all instruments at the disposal of the state while there are others who do not even consider it a threat and endorse extremism and militancy on one pretext or another. To understand the nature of this division and reasons for lack of will to deal with the issue of militancy, there is a need to dispassionately analyze the factors which have contributed to putting us in this quagmire.  Correct identification of the issue is imperative if we are to pursue any solutions.

I may start with the historical perspective. The history of our region reveals that, through centuries, Muslim warriors from the North (Afghanistan and beyond) have been invading the fertile lands of Punjab and further south on one pretext or another, often using religion as an instrument, ruled and ultimately merged with the society. The locals, instead of defending their motherland, mostly succumbed, merely because of the fact that they shared the same faith. Talibanization is another manifestation of the same phenomenon; some people construe it as Islam’s resurgence and gradually succumbing, as their ancestors.

Our ideological leaning is yet another factor; Pakistan was created on the basis of Two-Nation Theory, whereby religion was used as an instrument to achieve independence. Though the Quaid-e-Azam never meant Pakistan to be a theocratic state, the religious parties, soon after independence took to the streets and gave Pakistan an ideological orientation. No doubt, the ideology provided the new state with a strong base to exist, but since then, it has also provided the religious clergy with the leverage to use it for pursuance of their individual agendas.

This ideological orientation peaked during President Zia’s rule when he decided to serve as USA’s proxy and a deliberate decision was taken to recruit and train the ‘Jehadis’ for fighting in Afghanistan. He also wooed the religious parties to perpetuate his rule. Consequently, there was a mushroom growth of ‘Mujahideen’ groups, especially after their victory against the Soviet forces. The USA, after achieving her objective, left the region leaving Pakistan in the lurch and nothing was done to bring back diehard Mujahideen in the mainstream.

Government’s decision to join the coalition forces in WOT after 9/11 caused further division in the masses, aggravated by the fact that even as partners there was little convergence of interests between USA and Pakistan. As such, despite the fact that TTP’s certain undertakings are clearly against the state and they have taken ownership of thousands of Pakistanis killed, a considerable majority of the masses, especially those living in the rural areas and remain under the influence of religious clergy, consider their struggle as legitimate. Obviously, they do not differentiate between TTP and the Afghan Taliban, despite the divergence of their objectives – the former is pursuing take-over of the state of Pakistan while the later is fighting to oust the foreign forces from their motherland.

Unfortunately, owing to this mind-set of the masses or fear of reprisal, the political leadership is reluctant to take a firm stand against the militants and some even prefer to act as apologists. Resultantly, there is a lack of consensus – an imperative if we want to defeat militancy.

Extremism thrives in the environment of anarchy, disillusionment, poverty, illiteracy, general discontent, social injustice and lack of governance as these provide environment conducive for recruitment by militant groups. In Pakistan, we suffer from all such ailments and, as such, defeating extremism would remain a far-fetched dream unless the misgivings of the masses are removed through better governance.

Hitherto, barring Malala’s incident, the media has not played a defining role in making people aware of the looming threat posed by extremism. Most of the anchor persons / panelists either refrain from discussing the extremist militant groups or try to justify their actions by putting blame on the policies of the government. This trend would, surely, is a recipe for disaster. Extremism can best be checked through AWARENESS of the masses, for which electronic media can play an effective role.

These days there is a lot of talk about military operation in North Waziristan. In this regard, my submission is that if extremism and militancy could be defeated by military operations alone, the world’s most powerful countries, NATO / USA, would have achieved success in Afghanistan. The fact is that even after 11 years of commencement of Operation Enduring Freedom and spending over US$500 billion, they have so far failed to defeat the Taliban. As such, it is my considered opinion that any military operation in North Waziristan would be counter-productive. Instead, effective covert operations would pay greater dividends if launched after identifying different militant groups – ideologically motivated, foreign sponsored or criminals - and then dealing with them, accordingly.

If by compulsion, a military operation is required to be undertaken in a particular area against anti-Pakistan elements, foreign sponsored militants and criminals, it must be conducted after shaping the right environment, a domain of the political leadership. The steps deemed necessary are; (1) The operation should be legitimized by the parliament unequivocally, taking full ownership (2) It must be out rightly supported by the masses in general, media, the political leadership and, most importantly, the religious clergy (3) Massive rebuilding and political measures be undertaken in FATA to isolate the militant groups from the other tribesmen (4) Under no circumstances impression be created that the operation is being conducted on behest of USA or on her dictation.

To conclude, we can only fight extremism if we, somehow, break the shackles of our misplaced ideological leaning, develop consensus, improve governance and demonstrate the will as a nation to tackle this threat upfront. The big question; Are we up to it or, as always, embracing to succumb?  

Operation Enduring Freedom - USA’s attack on Taliban a venture in futility (My article published in THE NEWS on 7 October 2012)

On 7 October 2001, the US forces unleashed Operation Enduring Freedom (earlier called Infinite Justice) and attacked the Taliban Regime in Afghanistan with support of former Northern Alliance. Mazar-i-Sharif was captured on 9 November 2001, followed by control of most of northern Afghanistan, and Kabul fell on 13 November after the Taliban unexpectedly fled the city.

Though, apparently, a spectacular early tactical success, yet even after eleven years of initiation of this war, any semblance of victory seems far-fetched. Having suffered over 2000 casualties (official figure) and incurring expenditure of approximately US $ 500 billion, the USA continues to face the consequences of venturing into a country known as the graveyard of empires.  With no acceptable end to the war is in sight, operation ‘enduring freedom’ is turning into ‘enduring humiliation’ for the only super power.

On the 12^th anniversary of USA’s attack on Afghanistan, it would be worthwhile to briefly carry out an appraisal of this undertaking, where they went wrong and what course must be adopted to get out of the imbroglio.

To seek the reasons for USA’s failure in Afghanistan, we may start with the moral justification, or lack of it, for initiation of war; Use of military instrument for achievement of objectives must be the last resort when other options fail. The US policy makers, however, initiated the war in Afghanistan despite the fact that Taliban were showing flexibility and even covertly offered Bin Laden’s trial, provided evidence was provided against him. As such, right from the start, this war is seen as a manifestation of USA’s unilateralism and morally unjustified.

USA’s unilateralism was also manifested in the stance, “either you are with us or against us”. Though, as a result, countries joined the coalition, yet their troops, especially from NATO, lack motivation to fight in Afghanistan as they remain suspicious of the cause and USA’s intent. On the other hand, the Afghan Taliban are ideologically motivated, willing to die for their cause and their struggle is not ‘time barred’.

When a war is planned, the strategists must be clear as to the objectives to be achieved and in what time-frame. However, in the ongoing Afghan war, USA is either not clear or changing or has all along deceived the world about its real objectives. The initial military objectives of Operation Enduring Freedom included the destruction of terrorist training camps and infrastructure within Afghanistan, the capture of Al Qaeda leaders, and the cessation of terrorist activities in Afghanistan. Had the coalition forces confined to achievement of these objectives, they might have been successful. However, USA, under the garb of WOT, started to pursue their long term objectives in the region, which envisage gaining and maintaining control of Central Asia for; (1) Containment of China (2) Encirclement of Iran (3) Preventing this region from becoming a formidable political bloc in the future (4) Posing a threat to Pakistan’s nuclear program. This obviously was neither acceptable to Pakistan nor other regional countries, barring India and, as such, the counter moves started. The fact that the US policy makers have chosen to rely on the Northern Alliance, a former proxy of Russia-Iran-India Nexus, to achieve the above objectives, has further compounded USA’s problems.

Attack on Iraq was yet another strategic mistake and a major diversion from USA’s stated objectives of WOT being waged in Afghanistan. It provided Taliban the much needed respite to regroup and counter attack.

While Pakistan was earnestly cooperating with the USA, despite a very heavy cost, the latter, under the influence of certain anti-Pakistan lobbies, started to play a double game by adopting a strategy which envisaged destabilization of Pakistan for forcing her leadership into submission, especially on nuclear issue (replicating erstwhile USSR model). While, for the purpose, CIA-RAW Nexus found commonality of interests with a group of militants, Pakistan countered by wooing other groups and resultantly, the WOT suffered.

Amidst this mistrust, USA’s attempt to prematurely side-line Pakistan and give India pre-eminence in the end-game was yet another wrong move, a manifestation of their long-term intent. It was also a miscalculation on their part to depend on India for taking over responsibilities in Afghanistan. Indians obviously refused to oblige, and for the right reasons. With India’s reluctance and suspicious Pakistan, the contours of end-game are gradually diminishing and USA seems to be lost.

Another major reason for USA’s failure in Afghanistan is the internal strife between the State Department and the Pentagon / CIA. Apparently, while the State Department is pursuing Obama’s policies, the Pentagon / CIA are pursuing their independent agenda, serving certain strong lobbies. Resultantly, USA committed two strategic mistakes - the surge by inducting 30000 additional troops under Pentagon's pressure and announcement of time-lines for the draw-down. Taliban neither provide any worthwhile target nor have time constraints. Consequently, the US troops are now withdrawing without any semblance of victory and little to show for their misadventure and the cost paid.

As the things stand today, the NATO countries are getting wary of this protracted war, India just wants to reap any benefits that may accrue and hesitant to share the responsibility, there is complete distrust between USA, Pakistan and Afghanistan, China and Russia have gradually started to assert in the region, Taliban are sensing victory and USA does not know what to do next.

In the obtaining scenario, the USA Administration may opt for further military escalation spilling into Pakistan, as pursued by Leon Panetta on behest of certain strong lobbies in USA, or the political reconciliation. Adoption of former course, however, would have grave ramifications for USA in the long run.

Thus, the best course for USA Administration would be to factor in the limitations and adopt a more pragmatic approach based on political reconciliation between all stake holders, road to the success of which passes through Pakistan. The sooner they sit across the table with Pakistan to sort out the irking problems, better would be for both the countries and the region. Mutual trust for such an undertaking is imperative.