Since
Pakistan’s inception, military establishment has been playing a deciding role
in the formulation of our foreign policy and strategic options vis-à-vis USA.
After 9/11, the strategy, which we followed till recently, was formulated by a
military dictator, under duress and, probably, motivated by self-interest. It
was bound to failure as it over-looked the divergence of interests of the two
countries in the region and the logical result was the disaster, as manifested
in 2nd May 2011 and Salala Check-Post incidents. Fortunately, as a
welcome change, this time, the Parliamentary Committee for National Security
has deliberated at length and presented proposals defining the contours and
parameters of our future relations with USA and these are presently under
discussion in the Parliament. While, I am sure, our worthy parliamentarians
would come out with viable solutions, in-keeping with our national aspirations,
as well as the ground realities, they must remain cognizant of a few underlying
factors.
First and
foremost, the parliamentarians must clearly understand the dynamics of the
threats faced by Pakistan, both internal and external, our capability to
counter these threats and implications, thereof, in the shaped environment,
whereby, Pakistan, today, is isolated and seen as a threat to world peace. INTERNALLY,
IN MY VIEW, PAKISTAN, LIKE A HIGH VELOCITY MISSILE PRIMED FOR SELF-DESTRUCTION,
IS HEADING FOR A STRATEGIC DISASTER IN DIFFERENT SPHERES - POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC, INSTITUTIONAL – AND UNLESS CHANGE FOR THE BETTERMENT IS BROUGHT FROM
WITHIN, IT IS LIKELY TO EXPLODE. The prevailing and developing regional
scenarios present many opportunities for Pakistan and the opposition must not
try to play to the gallery and resort to point scoring on this important issue
of our national interest.
Secondly, it’s
a fact that our leaders have been exploiting our negative potential
(potential of destabilization) for quite some time for pursuing personal
agendas and the world at large is now not willing to give further concessions
on this account. Our positive potentials because of our geo-strategic location
and capacity to influence events in Afghanistan give us a lot of leverage to
negotiate with USA, which must be used for the benefit of the masses. Thirdly, in my view, there is no doubt that
owing to divergence of interests, both USA and Pakistan have been playing
double games with each other, however, neither has benefited from the
strategy followed hitherto. There is, thus, a need to revisit these strategies
by both and bring in transparency in their relationship. Fourthly, we must keep
in mind that the US leadership finds a commonality of interests with India for
pursuance of their long term objectives in the region and, thus, have formed a
Nexus with them. The strategy we now formulate must aim at tackling this nexus
and minimizing its negative impact on Pakistan. Fifthly, we must learn from the
dismemberment of erstwhile USSR that use of Low Intensity Conflict as an
instrument is the best strategy to subdue a nuclear state. Our negative
internal dynamics which lent us extremely vulnerable to this kind of warfare
and the fact that our neighbour in the East is inclined to pursue an indirect
approach to convert Pakistan into a pliant state, countering such pursuits
should remain one of the prime objectives of our foreign policy vis-à-vis USA
for which we may have to compromise on certain issues. And lastly,
notwithstanding commitments by the US leadership that their forces would be
withdrawn from Afghanistan by 2014, they are likely to maintain their presence
in the country and, as such, require a corridor or a supply line via Pakistan
to support their bases. THEREFORE, OUR NEW STRATEGY VIS-À-VIS USA MUST TAKE
INTO COGNIZANCE THE IMPLICATIONS OF LONG-TERM USA’S PRESENCE IN THE REGION.
While the PCNS
has deliberately covered most of the aspects that impact Pak-US relations and
forwarded viable proposals, somehow, the loop-holes left in some of the
proposed recommendations and absence of a clear-cut response to breaches by
USA, give the impression that these have been prepared with USA’s
understanding, that already a deal has been struck with the US authorities as
to which of these would be implemented and that the whole exercise is for
public consumption. This is where the opposition can play an effective role by
ensuring that the final recommendations are doable, put in black and white with
no ambiguity on the response to any future breaches of accepted clauses
and a few also need rethinking and
inclusion;
(1) When we
seek transparency in presence of foreign spies, we indirectly admit that they
would be acceptable if the conditions are met – a breach of our sovereignty.
Why must we permit foreign spies?
(2) Similarly,
the proposal that the use of bases or airspace by foreign forces would be
permitted after parliament’s approval, indirectly indicates the possibility for
providing such bases to USA in future, for which clear-cut terms and conditions
should be defined.
(3) While
proposal to levy taxes on US supplies is logical, the amount we are likely to
fetch (approximately US$1million a day, as reported in the press) is peanuts as
compared to what the Americans are spending for supporting their forces in Afghanistan.
We need to get the right price for our co-operation, if we decide so open the
NATO supplies. Let not the individuals be benefited as hitherto.
(4) WHILE
DRONE ATTACKS DO IMPINGE ON OUR SOVEREIGNTY, THE PAKISTANI OR FOREIGN MILITANTS
WHO GO ACROSS INTO AFGHANISTAN AND HIT US/NATO/AFGHAN FORCES ALSO BREACH THEIR
SOVEREIGNTY. IF PAKISTAN CANNOT STOP THESE MILITANTS FROM GOING ACROSS WHO,
NATURALLY, DO NOT RECOGNIZE ANY BORDERS, HOW CAN IT JUSTIFY ITS STANCE OF
CONDEMNING DRONE ATTACKS ACROSS THIS SIDE OF THE BORDER? THIS INTRICACY HAS TO
BE RESOLVED FOR A VIABLE SOLUTION TO THE ISSUE.
(5) USA is
unlikely to accept the proposal of an India like civil nuclear deal with
Pakistan. Instead, we should demand Pakistan’s recognition as a nuclear state
with the right to seek similar deals with other nuclear powers.
(6)
Surprisingly, there is no mention of what role USA should play in solving
Kashmir dispute, Pakistan’s role in the future dispensation in Afghanistan and
interference in Balochistan. These need to be incorporated.
Hopefully,
with the loop-holes in the proposed recommendations plugged, we are likely to
formulate a viable strategy vis-à-vis USA which is based on realism, but
reflective of our public sentiment, and in keeping with our national interests.