These
days, barring PM’s gimmicks related to contempt case, ‘Pak-US relations’ is the
most discussed topic in the electronic and print media, with quite a number of
journalists and anchorpersons blaming the military establishment for the
ongoing stand-off with USA. Though in a democratic dispensation everybody has
the right to express his or her views freely, yet we must remain cognizant of
the fact that wrong assumptions, and conclusions drawn thereof, may mislead
those assigned to formulate policies.
That
is exactly what happened when the PCNS, and later the political leadership, sat
down to deliberate on future Pak-US relations. Influenced by ‘ideas’ of some of
our ‘brains’ who thought it was time to exploit USA’s apparent weaknesses in
Afghanistan, they failed to factor-in two important aspects while presenting
their demands to the USA; Pakistan’s vulnerabilities and, more importantly,
USA’s internal dynamics emanating from ongoing tussle between the two power centres – White House vs the
Pentagon / CIA, with profound impact during the election year. Besides,
our policy makers also failed to present a unanimous viewpoint on major issues
related to Pak-US relations and wasted time on point scoring, a luxury we could
ill afford at this critical juncture. The
demands, based on wrong conclusions and assumptions were obviously not met and,
hence
the stand-off.
While our vulnerabilities are well known, in this
write-up I will briefly dwell upon USA’s internal dissentions on strategy for Afghanistan,
how they are affecting Pak-US relations and what course may be adopted to
safeguard our national interests.
President Obama, in keeping with popular slogan
during his last election campaign, has already given his exit plan for
withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan by 2014. While the State Department is
vigorously pursuing this objective, the Pentagon and CIA seem to be following
their own agenda, envisaging long-term presence of US forces in the region. In
this pursuit, they are not only being supported by the Republicans but also the
strong lobbies which exercise profound influence on US policy making. Following
lent credence to such a conclusion.
Though President Obama was not inclined, yet was
‘persuaded’ by Pentagon for induction of 30,000 additional troops in
Afghanistan. US military strategists should have known that even after this
surge, they would not achieve any worthwhile victory for the simple reason that
Taliban do not provide any tangible targets. Why, then, the surge? The only
plausible answer is that all along Pentagon nurtured the intentions to provoke
Pakistan, having tangible targets, neutralization of which may provide the US
military with some semblance of victory.
Attack on Salala Post, as such, was a well planned
operation designed to escalate tensions with Pakistan for ensuring long-term
deployment of US forces in Afghanistan. By doing so, US military would continue
to receive enhanced allocations of over US$100 bn annually and Leon Panetta
would secure the patronage of lobbies which are seeking to undermine Pakistan
and consider President Obama as an impediment in pursuance of their designs.
Panetta has developed political ambitions after successful Operation Geronimo,
considers Hillary Clinton as a rival in political arena and seeking to gain
edge over her.
Besides attack on Salala Post, other indicators
also suggest that Pentagon and CIA, on behest of certain lobbies, are ensuring
failure of Obama’s strategy in Afghanistan. While the State Department is
endeavouring to bring the Haqqani Network on the negotiation table with
Pakistan’s help, they are continuously acting as a spoiler by conducting drone
attacks and demanding that Pakistani forces should undertake operations against
the Haqqanis.
Then, while the US State Department showed
inclination of rendering an apology on Salala incident, it was the military
leadership who firmly dispelled any such option.
Recently, US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta gave a
statement that charges of US$5000 per container, supposedly demanded by
Pakistan, were not acceptable, notwithstanding the fact all told the container
charges at this rate would come to slightly over US$ 1 bn annually, nothing
compared to over US$100 bn which USA spends for maintaining forces in
Afghanistan. Should such a negligible amount be of any consequence if Pentagon
was sincere in implementation of President Obama’s exit plan?
Thus, contrary to the perception being developed by
some journalists and anchorpersons that GHQ is responsible for the stand-off
with USA, actually it’s the Pentagon, supported by CIA, which is acting as a
spoiler and dictating terms on Obama and the State Department about strategy to
be followed vis-a-vis Pakistan and Afghanistan.
That be the case, if President Obama is sincere in
defusing tensions with Pakistan and implement his exit plan, he must recognize
the problems within, muster up the courage to rein-in the military / CIA and
let the State Department deal with the contentious issues. In short, he must
start to assert.
As for the Pakistani leadership, they must have
clear understanding of the evolving situation, wash-off misplaced notion of
relevance and shun arrogance, emanating from ignorance, to ensure formulation
and implementation of a viable strategy vis-a-vis USA. National interest rather
than seeking a few hundred US dollars should be the guiding principle, as the
latter would mean nothing for a country which loses Rs 5bn daily due to
corruption as per DG NAB’s recent statement.
In this regard, despite many hiccups, I see a
commonality of interest between President Obama, Pakistan and the Taliban on a
singular agenda point – withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan by 2014. To
ensure sincerity of purpose by all stake holders, Pakistan may even undertake a
diplomatic initiative involving international powers, stakeholders and UN to
seek commitments from USA on implementation of its exit plan.
At our end, all needed support must be
provided for ensuring smooth withdrawal
of US forces from Afghanistan, may it be opening of GLOC and convincing Taliban
/ Haqqanis to negotiate with USA, as any hindrance, actual or perceived, would
tantamount to serving the cause of Pentagon, CIA, and anti-Pakistan lobbies. If
they are bent upon pursuing a confrontationist course against Pakistan, why
must we fall into their trap and provide them with the excuse.
Even
if no assurances are provided by USA about implementation of their exit plan, I
see no sense in getting on the left side of extra regional forces which are
likely to remain in our immediate neighbourhood for some time to come, as long
as the red lines are clear to both the sides.
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