Hidden hands behind the Pak-US stand-off? (my article published in THE NEWS on 7 June 2012)

These days, barring PM’s gimmicks related to contempt case, ‘Pak-US relations’ is the most discussed topic in the electronic and print media, with quite a number of journalists and anchorpersons blaming the military establishment for the ongoing stand-off with USA. Though in a democratic dispensation everybody has the right to express his or her views freely, yet we must remain cognizant of the fact that wrong assumptions, and conclusions drawn thereof, may mislead those assigned to formulate policies.

That is exactly what happened when the PCNS, and later the political leadership, sat down to deliberate on future Pak-US relations. Influenced by ‘ideas’ of some of our ‘brains’ who thought it was time to exploit USA’s apparent weaknesses in Afghanistan, they failed to factor-in two important aspects while presenting their demands to the USA; Pakistan’s vulnerabilities and, more importantly, USA’s internal dynamics emanating from ongoing tussle between the two power centres – White House vs the Pentagon / CIA, with profound impact during the election year. Besides, our policy makers also failed to present a unanimous viewpoint on major issues related to Pak-US relations and wasted time on point scoring, a luxury we could ill afford at this critical juncture. The demands, based on wrong conclusions and assumptions were obviously not met and, hence the stand-off.

While our vulnerabilities are well known, in this write-up I will briefly dwell upon USA’s internal dissentions on strategy for Afghanistan, how they are affecting Pak-US relations and what course may be adopted to safeguard our national interests.

President Obama, in keeping with popular slogan during his last election campaign, has already given his exit plan for withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan by 2014. While the State Department is vigorously pursuing this objective, the Pentagon and CIA seem to be following their own agenda, envisaging long-term presence of US forces in the region. In this pursuit, they are not only being supported by the Republicans but also the strong lobbies which exercise profound influence on US policy making. Following lent credence to such a conclusion.    

Though President Obama was not inclined, yet was ‘persuaded’ by Pentagon for induction of 30,000 additional troops in Afghanistan. US military strategists should have known that even after this surge, they would not achieve any worthwhile victory for the simple reason that Taliban do not provide any tangible targets. Why, then, the surge? The only plausible answer is that all along Pentagon nurtured the intentions to provoke Pakistan, having tangible targets, neutralization of which may provide the US military with some semblance of victory.

Attack on Salala Post, as such, was a well planned operation designed to escalate tensions with Pakistan for ensuring long-term deployment of US forces in Afghanistan. By doing so, US military would continue to receive enhanced allocations of over US$100 bn annually and Leon Panetta would secure the patronage of lobbies which are seeking to undermine Pakistan and consider President Obama as an impediment in pursuance of their designs. Panetta has developed political ambitions after successful Operation Geronimo, considers Hillary Clinton as a rival in political arena and seeking to gain edge over her.

Besides attack on Salala Post, other indicators also suggest that Pentagon and CIA, on behest of certain lobbies, are ensuring failure of Obama’s strategy in Afghanistan. While the State Department is endeavouring to bring the Haqqani Network on the negotiation table with Pakistan’s help, they are continuously acting as a spoiler by conducting drone attacks and demanding that Pakistani forces should undertake operations against the Haqqanis.

Then, while the US State Department showed inclination of rendering an apology on Salala incident, it was the military leadership who firmly dispelled any such option.

Recently, US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta gave a statement that charges of US$5000 per container, supposedly demanded by Pakistan, were not acceptable, notwithstanding the fact all told the container charges at this rate would come to slightly over US$ 1 bn annually, nothing compared to over US$100 bn which USA spends for maintaining forces in Afghanistan. Should such a negligible amount be of any consequence if Pentagon was sincere in implementation of President Obama’s exit plan?

Thus, contrary to the perception being developed by some journalists and anchorpersons that GHQ is responsible for the stand-off with USA, actually it’s the Pentagon, supported by CIA, which is acting as a spoiler and dictating terms on Obama and the State Department about strategy to be followed vis-a-vis Pakistan and Afghanistan.

That be the case, if President Obama is sincere in defusing tensions with Pakistan and implement his exit plan, he must recognize the problems within, muster up the courage to rein-in the military / CIA and let the State Department deal with the contentious issues. In short, he must start to assert.

As for the Pakistani leadership, they must have clear understanding of the evolving situation, wash-off misplaced notion of relevance and shun arrogance, emanating from ignorance, to ensure formulation and implementation of a viable strategy vis-a-vis USA. National interest rather than seeking a few hundred US dollars should be the guiding principle, as the latter would mean nothing for a country which loses Rs 5bn daily due to corruption as per DG NAB’s recent statement.

In this regard, despite many hiccups, I see a commonality of interest between President Obama, Pakistan and the Taliban on a singular agenda point – withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan by 2014. To ensure sincerity of purpose by all stake holders, Pakistan may even undertake a diplomatic initiative involving international powers, stakeholders and UN to seek commitments from USA on implementation of its exit plan.

At our end, all needed support must be provided  for ensuring smooth withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, may it be opening of GLOC and convincing Taliban / Haqqanis to negotiate with USA, as any hindrance, actual or perceived, would tantamount to serving the cause of Pentagon, CIA, and anti-Pakistan lobbies. If they are bent upon pursuing a confrontationist course against Pakistan, why must we fall into their trap and provide them with the excuse.  

Even if no assurances are provided by USA about implementation of their exit plan, I see no sense in getting on the left side of extra regional forces which are likely to remain in our immediate neighbourhood for some time to come, as long as the red lines are clear to both the sides.

Colonization of a new kind (My article published in the NEWS on 4th January 2012)

Pakistan’s geo-strategic location as gate-way to Central Asia and its emergence as a nuclear armed ‘Islamic state’, have made it extremely vulnerable to power games of many countries with the USA as the major player.  Though apparently they attacked Afghanistan to topple the Taliban Government and bring perpetrators of 9/11 to justice, in my view, they, in any case, would have attacked Afghanistan on one pretext or another to gain and maintain foot-hold in Central Asia, which is considered imperative for implementation of their ‘containment of China’ strategy. And, since, the USA sees India as a strategic partner in their ‘Grand Design’ for the region, by implication Pakistan must be brought to a level of a pliant state and de-fanged as a nuclear irritant to India.

To achieve the above mentioned objectives vis-à-vis Pakistan, the USA Administration could exercise three options – (1) The ‘military option’ (2) ‘Erstwhile USSR model’, whereby, USSR was internally destabilized, made economically unviable and then a deal was struck for dismantling of its nuclear warheads deployed outside the Russian Federation (3) The ‘indirect control model’ i.e controlling a country by controlling its leadership.

The military option could have grave ramifications and, as such, discarded by US policy makers, unless absolutely warranted. Former US President Bush, under the influence of anti-Pakistan lobbies, tried to implement the ‘Erstwhile USSR model’ in Pakistan, wherein, CIA-RAW Nexus found commonality of interests with a group of Taliban to breed instability. Pakistan responded by double-dealing with them and as it became clear by end 2006 that the strategy was bound to failure, the US policy makers decided to exercise the third option, ‘to achieve control on Pakistan by controlling Pakistan’s leadership, through incentives and coercion’. This strategy is not only followed in most of the Middle Eastern countries but the past history of most of the areas that now comprise Pakistan also lent credence to the adopted strategy which reveals that through centuries, invaders from the North (Afghanistan / Central Asia) and the British ruled the area in connivance with influential locals, who in return for certain ‘incentives’ owed allegiance to these foreign rulers. The masses also generally displayed subservience to these so-called ruling elites, ‘imposed’ on them by ‘outsiders’.

Though USA Administrations had always felt comfortable to deal with military dictators, yet historically, they, at a certain stage tended to show defiance. As such, when in 2006 Musharraf was found reluctant to dance to their tune, it was principally decided to invest in the political leadership. Benazir, while in exile, played a major role in reinforcing this thought process. The strategy by USA vis-à-vis Pakistan, thus, envisaged; (1) Pakistani leaders willing to support the US agenda in the region would be ‘assisted’ to reach the corridors of power (2)  Ingress in the major institutions would be achieved by cultivating ‘local assets’, thereby, establishing a network to ‘elevate and protect’ those who comply and ‘marginalize’ those not falling in line (3) Preferably, with passage of time, alternate leadership would be prepared to ensure friendly change, if situation so demands (4)  Rampant corruption, economic dependence on USA and negative internal dynamics of Pakistan would serve as tools to support the strategy.

Musharraf was, thus, ‘persuaded’ to enter into a deal with Benazir, NRO was promulgated, Benazir returned, changed her stance being a true leader, became a victim in a suicide attack and Zardari provided the required replacement.      

While NRO brokered by the USA had paved the way for return and assent to power of ‘local assets’ willing to play their game, what could be expected of them in return; firstly, to support the USA’s ‘Grand Design’ in the region as mentioned above and, secondly, create internal environment for successful application of USA’s strategy of converting Pakistan into a pliant state in the long term. In my view, following undertakings by the ‘assets’, implanted through NRO or already emplaced, would ensure  achievement of these objectives; (1) Crippling of Pakistan’s economy to a level, whereby, it remains dependent on USA (2) Sabotage of Pakistan’s nuclear program through indirect methods (3) Undermining of the Army’s status as a center of gravity, establishing control over them, and curtailing their ability to breed ‘Strategic Defiance’ to the USA’s ‘Grand Design’ in the region (4) Assisting in ingress of CIA ‘assets’ in major institutions to support the ‘implanted’ leadership. (Imprints of this ‘ingress’ are already visible if one critically observes recent happenings e.g in the memogate scandal, a ‘rescue apparatus’ has been immediately energized and set into motion to protect those looking after US interests) (5) Accepting India’s pre-eminence and undertaking measures to ensure that the Pakistani nation reconciles with the idea (6) Supporting USA’s war effort in the region.      

Though these ‘assets’ have managed to deliver to their ‘sponsors’ on different fronts, yet it failed to achieve any progress with regard to ‘control’ over the Armed Forces. 2 May 2011, provided a unique opportunity to the ruling elite to gain ‘control’ over the Army as its image hit the rock bottom. They could even have acted against the Army leadership by virtue of the authority vested in them by the constitution but lacked the courage to do so without guaranteed US support and, hence, the memo was initiated, which is a reality beyond doubt. Though the Government’s desire to achieve ‘control’ over the military establishment is a legitimate one, yet seeking help of a foreign power for the purpose and, most importantly, the offers made, thereof, in return are serious issues impinging on our sovereignty. 

From the above perspective, the memogate investigations assume greater importance as the outcome would ultimately set direction for the nation. If the justice prevails, the nation may hope to break the shackles of slavery being woven around it and in case the CIA’s fully emplaced ‘rescue apparatus’ is able to save the perpetrators of ‘memogate’, the nation would be destined to enslavement as in the past, this time to be controlled directly or indirectly by the USA, through their implanted ‘assets’ – colonization of a new kind.