Military operation in North Waziristan? ( My article published in the NEWS on 5 Sep 2012)

Leon Panetta’s disclosure, for reasons best known to him, that Pakistan Army was planning an operation in Waziristan, followed by General Kayani’s 14 August speech in which he, probably for the first time, openly acknowledged that ‘war on terror’ is also Pakistan’s war, has stirred debate on likely military operation in North Waziristan and its implications thereof. After going through various articles on the subject, one gets the impression that only the military establishment is responsible for the present mess and it is time to redeem. While this argument may carry some weight, the issue is much more complicated for easy understanding.

Let me first start with the public perception which emanates from the belief that Pakistan is ‘an ideological state’ and since the Islamic concept of nationalism advocates the concept of ‘ummah’, majority of the masses, especially in the rural areas, who remain under the influence of religious clergy, consider Taliban’s struggle as legitimate. They fail to comprehend as to why ‘Mujahideen’ of yester years are now called ‘terrorists’. To date, neither the media nor the politicians have picked up the courage to change this mind-set and educate the masses.

Despite being a pluralist organization, the intake in military comes from the same background, Islam is still a major motivation and soldiers need to be convinced that the operations they undertake against their own people, or perceived to be such, are justified.

In such environment, General Kayani’s remarks on 14 August that ‘war on terror is also our war’ must be appreciated as a bold step, setting right direction for the Army, if not for the nation. However, these remarks in no way imply that the military would undertake operation in North Waziristan on USA’s dictation. In my view, certain considerations would dictate whether the operation should be undertaken or not and if the decision is in affirmative, certain pre-requisites must be met before embarking on this venture.

Considerations; (1) Is the Pakistani public in favor of such an operation? (2) In spite of the general perception in Pakistan that foreign forces are presently occupying Afghanistan, the worldwide view is that they are UN mandated and supported by a legitimate Afghan government. That be the case, are local militants within their right to undertake terrorist activities in Afghanistan? (3) If the local Taliban do not accept Pakistan Government’s writ and go across to Afghanistan to hit the NATO/Afghan forces, how should the Pakistan Government respond to any counter action by them? Should we put our country at stake for those who do not even accept government’s writ? (4) A friendly and stable Afghanistan is surely in Pakistan’s interest. This being the objective, are the local militants part of the solution or part of the problem? (5) Notwithstanding emotional outbursts which some of our leaders display, is the nation prepared to face the consequences of local militants’ continued declared interference into the internal affairs of Afghanistan? If not, how to stop them? (6) Negative international perception about Pakistan with regard to ongoing militancy. (7) And finally, internal fall out of any such operation and its ramifications.

If as a conclusion to above considerations, an operation is deemed necessary, the same be undertaken after meeting certain pre-requisites, especially in view of our past experiences. While considering the external factor, we must never forget that in the eighties, Pakistan fought along-side USA and together we were instrumental in ousting the Soviets from Afghanistan. After achieving their objectives, however, USA left us in the lurch to face the consequences. Similarly, not very long time back, our forces undertook operations in Swat and South Waziristan and since the border on Afghan side was not sealed, the terrorists not only went across but since then are conducting terrorist activities against Pakistan, with impunity, from their safe-havens in Afghanistan, if not under the patronage of NATO/Afghan forces but certainly from areas presently controlled by them.  

In this backdrop, it would be natural for the Pakistani leadership to be apprehensive about USA’s intent behind compelling us to undertake operation in North Waziristan. We must never preclude the possibility that the USA only wants us to attack the militants so that the weakened militants could be pressurized by them into negotiations for extracting a better deal, which may not be in Pakistan’s best interests. Besides, the backlash, if also sponsored by hostile intelligence agencies, would be crippling for Pakistan. As such, Pakistan Army must not undertake this operation unless the border across is sealed by ISAF/US forces and guarantees are given that the retreating militants would not be given safe passage to be used against Pakistan in the future. Also, Pakistan must be included as a party in any future negotiations, overt or covert, with the Taliban.  

Internally, the experience shows that successful military operations in Swat and South Waziristan were not backed by the required political process for seeking permanent solution. The Army still is deployed and committed in these areas. As such, any future military operation must be preceded by shaping of environment for which the political leadership must take full ownership and media should be effectively used to educate the masses. Well planned covert operations must be undertaken to isolate the militants from the locals, though a difficult proposition till the time locals carry the impression that militants are waging ‘jihad’ against foreign forces in Afghanistan. Speedy rehabilitation and initiation of political process after successful military operation are imperatives for a permanent solution, which must be planned in advance. The political leadership must also be fully prepared to deal with any internal fall out of such an operation.

And finally, in the prevailing regional environment, sincerity of purpose is of prime essence. Both Pakistan and USA must learn from the past mistakes, recognize the threat in its larger context, formulate a comprehensive threat response and then appropriately deal with the rogue elements. Double games by USA or Pakistan or both have neither served their interests in the past nor they would in the future – threat is too grave to play around.

Hidden hands behind the Pak-US stand-off? (my article published in THE NEWS on 7 June 2012)

These days, barring PM’s gimmicks related to contempt case, ‘Pak-US relations’ is the most discussed topic in the electronic and print media, with quite a number of journalists and anchorpersons blaming the military establishment for the ongoing stand-off with USA. Though in a democratic dispensation everybody has the right to express his or her views freely, yet we must remain cognizant of the fact that wrong assumptions, and conclusions drawn thereof, may mislead those assigned to formulate policies.

That is exactly what happened when the PCNS, and later the political leadership, sat down to deliberate on future Pak-US relations. Influenced by ‘ideas’ of some of our ‘brains’ who thought it was time to exploit USA’s apparent weaknesses in Afghanistan, they failed to factor-in two important aspects while presenting their demands to the USA; Pakistan’s vulnerabilities and, more importantly, USA’s internal dynamics emanating from ongoing tussle between the two power centres – White House vs the Pentagon / CIA, with profound impact during the election year. Besides, our policy makers also failed to present a unanimous viewpoint on major issues related to Pak-US relations and wasted time on point scoring, a luxury we could ill afford at this critical juncture. The demands, based on wrong conclusions and assumptions were obviously not met and, hence the stand-off.

While our vulnerabilities are well known, in this write-up I will briefly dwell upon USA’s internal dissentions on strategy for Afghanistan, how they are affecting Pak-US relations and what course may be adopted to safeguard our national interests.

President Obama, in keeping with popular slogan during his last election campaign, has already given his exit plan for withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan by 2014. While the State Department is vigorously pursuing this objective, the Pentagon and CIA seem to be following their own agenda, envisaging long-term presence of US forces in the region. In this pursuit, they are not only being supported by the Republicans but also the strong lobbies which exercise profound influence on US policy making. Following lent credence to such a conclusion.    

Though President Obama was not inclined, yet was ‘persuaded’ by Pentagon for induction of 30,000 additional troops in Afghanistan. US military strategists should have known that even after this surge, they would not achieve any worthwhile victory for the simple reason that Taliban do not provide any tangible targets. Why, then, the surge? The only plausible answer is that all along Pentagon nurtured the intentions to provoke Pakistan, having tangible targets, neutralization of which may provide the US military with some semblance of victory.

Attack on Salala Post, as such, was a well planned operation designed to escalate tensions with Pakistan for ensuring long-term deployment of US forces in Afghanistan. By doing so, US military would continue to receive enhanced allocations of over US$100 bn annually and Leon Panetta would secure the patronage of lobbies which are seeking to undermine Pakistan and consider President Obama as an impediment in pursuance of their designs. Panetta has developed political ambitions after successful Operation Geronimo, considers Hillary Clinton as a rival in political arena and seeking to gain edge over her.

Besides attack on Salala Post, other indicators also suggest that Pentagon and CIA, on behest of certain lobbies, are ensuring failure of Obama’s strategy in Afghanistan. While the State Department is endeavouring to bring the Haqqani Network on the negotiation table with Pakistan’s help, they are continuously acting as a spoiler by conducting drone attacks and demanding that Pakistani forces should undertake operations against the Haqqanis.

Then, while the US State Department showed inclination of rendering an apology on Salala incident, it was the military leadership who firmly dispelled any such option.

Recently, US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta gave a statement that charges of US$5000 per container, supposedly demanded by Pakistan, were not acceptable, notwithstanding the fact all told the container charges at this rate would come to slightly over US$ 1 bn annually, nothing compared to over US$100 bn which USA spends for maintaining forces in Afghanistan. Should such a negligible amount be of any consequence if Pentagon was sincere in implementation of President Obama’s exit plan?

Thus, contrary to the perception being developed by some journalists and anchorpersons that GHQ is responsible for the stand-off with USA, actually it’s the Pentagon, supported by CIA, which is acting as a spoiler and dictating terms on Obama and the State Department about strategy to be followed vis-a-vis Pakistan and Afghanistan.

That be the case, if President Obama is sincere in defusing tensions with Pakistan and implement his exit plan, he must recognize the problems within, muster up the courage to rein-in the military / CIA and let the State Department deal with the contentious issues. In short, he must start to assert.

As for the Pakistani leadership, they must have clear understanding of the evolving situation, wash-off misplaced notion of relevance and shun arrogance, emanating from ignorance, to ensure formulation and implementation of a viable strategy vis-a-vis USA. National interest rather than seeking a few hundred US dollars should be the guiding principle, as the latter would mean nothing for a country which loses Rs 5bn daily due to corruption as per DG NAB’s recent statement.

In this regard, despite many hiccups, I see a commonality of interest between President Obama, Pakistan and the Taliban on a singular agenda point – withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan by 2014. To ensure sincerity of purpose by all stake holders, Pakistan may even undertake a diplomatic initiative involving international powers, stakeholders and UN to seek commitments from USA on implementation of its exit plan.

At our end, all needed support must be provided  for ensuring smooth withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, may it be opening of GLOC and convincing Taliban / Haqqanis to negotiate with USA, as any hindrance, actual or perceived, would tantamount to serving the cause of Pentagon, CIA, and anti-Pakistan lobbies. If they are bent upon pursuing a confrontationist course against Pakistan, why must we fall into their trap and provide them with the excuse.  

Even if no assurances are provided by USA about implementation of their exit plan, I see no sense in getting on the left side of extra regional forces which are likely to remain in our immediate neighbourhood for some time to come, as long as the red lines are clear to both the sides.