Are we ready to fight or succumb to extremism (My article published in THE NEWS on 22 October 2012)

Pakistan, today, stands isolated internationally, weakened internally and faces a serious existential threat from militancy, brewed within, as well as, externally sponsored. Unfortunately, the nation seems to be divided on the issue; some feel that militancy must be ruthlessly rooted out from our society using all instruments at the disposal of the state while there are others who do not even consider it a threat and endorse extremism and militancy on one pretext or another. To understand the nature of this division and reasons for lack of will to deal with the issue of militancy, there is a need to dispassionately analyze the factors which have contributed to putting us in this quagmire.  Correct identification of the issue is imperative if we are to pursue any solutions.

I may start with the historical perspective. The history of our region reveals that, through centuries, Muslim warriors from the North (Afghanistan and beyond) have been invading the fertile lands of Punjab and further south on one pretext or another, often using religion as an instrument, ruled and ultimately merged with the society. The locals, instead of defending their motherland, mostly succumbed, merely because of the fact that they shared the same faith. Talibanization is another manifestation of the same phenomenon; some people construe it as Islam’s resurgence and gradually succumbing, as their ancestors.

Our ideological leaning is yet another factor; Pakistan was created on the basis of Two-Nation Theory, whereby religion was used as an instrument to achieve independence. Though the Quaid-e-Azam never meant Pakistan to be a theocratic state, the religious parties, soon after independence took to the streets and gave Pakistan an ideological orientation. No doubt, the ideology provided the new state with a strong base to exist, but since then, it has also provided the religious clergy with the leverage to use it for pursuance of their individual agendas.

This ideological orientation peaked during President Zia’s rule when he decided to serve as USA’s proxy and a deliberate decision was taken to recruit and train the ‘Jehadis’ for fighting in Afghanistan. He also wooed the religious parties to perpetuate his rule. Consequently, there was a mushroom growth of ‘Mujahideen’ groups, especially after their victory against the Soviet forces. The USA, after achieving her objective, left the region leaving Pakistan in the lurch and nothing was done to bring back diehard Mujahideen in the mainstream.

Government’s decision to join the coalition forces in WOT after 9/11 caused further division in the masses, aggravated by the fact that even as partners there was little convergence of interests between USA and Pakistan. As such, despite the fact that TTP’s certain undertakings are clearly against the state and they have taken ownership of thousands of Pakistanis killed, a considerable majority of the masses, especially those living in the rural areas and remain under the influence of religious clergy, consider their struggle as legitimate. Obviously, they do not differentiate between TTP and the Afghan Taliban, despite the divergence of their objectives – the former is pursuing take-over of the state of Pakistan while the later is fighting to oust the foreign forces from their motherland.

Unfortunately, owing to this mind-set of the masses or fear of reprisal, the political leadership is reluctant to take a firm stand against the militants and some even prefer to act as apologists. Resultantly, there is a lack of consensus – an imperative if we want to defeat militancy.

Extremism thrives in the environment of anarchy, disillusionment, poverty, illiteracy, general discontent, social injustice and lack of governance as these provide environment conducive for recruitment by militant groups. In Pakistan, we suffer from all such ailments and, as such, defeating extremism would remain a far-fetched dream unless the misgivings of the masses are removed through better governance.

Hitherto, barring Malala’s incident, the media has not played a defining role in making people aware of the looming threat posed by extremism. Most of the anchor persons / panelists either refrain from discussing the extremist militant groups or try to justify their actions by putting blame on the policies of the government. This trend would, surely, is a recipe for disaster. Extremism can best be checked through AWARENESS of the masses, for which electronic media can play an effective role.

These days there is a lot of talk about military operation in North Waziristan. In this regard, my submission is that if extremism and militancy could be defeated by military operations alone, the world’s most powerful countries, NATO / USA, would have achieved success in Afghanistan. The fact is that even after 11 years of commencement of Operation Enduring Freedom and spending over US$500 billion, they have so far failed to defeat the Taliban. As such, it is my considered opinion that any military operation in North Waziristan would be counter-productive. Instead, effective covert operations would pay greater dividends if launched after identifying different militant groups – ideologically motivated, foreign sponsored or criminals - and then dealing with them, accordingly.

If by compulsion, a military operation is required to be undertaken in a particular area against anti-Pakistan elements, foreign sponsored militants and criminals, it must be conducted after shaping the right environment, a domain of the political leadership. The steps deemed necessary are; (1) The operation should be legitimized by the parliament unequivocally, taking full ownership (2) It must be out rightly supported by the masses in general, media, the political leadership and, most importantly, the religious clergy (3) Massive rebuilding and political measures be undertaken in FATA to isolate the militant groups from the other tribesmen (4) Under no circumstances impression be created that the operation is being conducted on behest of USA or on her dictation.

To conclude, we can only fight extremism if we, somehow, break the shackles of our misplaced ideological leaning, develop consensus, improve governance and demonstrate the will as a nation to tackle this threat upfront. The big question; Are we up to it or, as always, embracing to succumb?  

Military operation in North Waziristan? ( My article published in the NEWS on 5 Sep 2012)

Leon Panetta’s disclosure, for reasons best known to him, that Pakistan Army was planning an operation in Waziristan, followed by General Kayani’s 14 August speech in which he, probably for the first time, openly acknowledged that ‘war on terror’ is also Pakistan’s war, has stirred debate on likely military operation in North Waziristan and its implications thereof. After going through various articles on the subject, one gets the impression that only the military establishment is responsible for the present mess and it is time to redeem. While this argument may carry some weight, the issue is much more complicated for easy understanding.

Let me first start with the public perception which emanates from the belief that Pakistan is ‘an ideological state’ and since the Islamic concept of nationalism advocates the concept of ‘ummah’, majority of the masses, especially in the rural areas, who remain under the influence of religious clergy, consider Taliban’s struggle as legitimate. They fail to comprehend as to why ‘Mujahideen’ of yester years are now called ‘terrorists’. To date, neither the media nor the politicians have picked up the courage to change this mind-set and educate the masses.

Despite being a pluralist organization, the intake in military comes from the same background, Islam is still a major motivation and soldiers need to be convinced that the operations they undertake against their own people, or perceived to be such, are justified.

In such environment, General Kayani’s remarks on 14 August that ‘war on terror is also our war’ must be appreciated as a bold step, setting right direction for the Army, if not for the nation. However, these remarks in no way imply that the military would undertake operation in North Waziristan on USA’s dictation. In my view, certain considerations would dictate whether the operation should be undertaken or not and if the decision is in affirmative, certain pre-requisites must be met before embarking on this venture.

Considerations; (1) Is the Pakistani public in favor of such an operation? (2) In spite of the general perception in Pakistan that foreign forces are presently occupying Afghanistan, the worldwide view is that they are UN mandated and supported by a legitimate Afghan government. That be the case, are local militants within their right to undertake terrorist activities in Afghanistan? (3) If the local Taliban do not accept Pakistan Government’s writ and go across to Afghanistan to hit the NATO/Afghan forces, how should the Pakistan Government respond to any counter action by them? Should we put our country at stake for those who do not even accept government’s writ? (4) A friendly and stable Afghanistan is surely in Pakistan’s interest. This being the objective, are the local militants part of the solution or part of the problem? (5) Notwithstanding emotional outbursts which some of our leaders display, is the nation prepared to face the consequences of local militants’ continued declared interference into the internal affairs of Afghanistan? If not, how to stop them? (6) Negative international perception about Pakistan with regard to ongoing militancy. (7) And finally, internal fall out of any such operation and its ramifications.

If as a conclusion to above considerations, an operation is deemed necessary, the same be undertaken after meeting certain pre-requisites, especially in view of our past experiences. While considering the external factor, we must never forget that in the eighties, Pakistan fought along-side USA and together we were instrumental in ousting the Soviets from Afghanistan. After achieving their objectives, however, USA left us in the lurch to face the consequences. Similarly, not very long time back, our forces undertook operations in Swat and South Waziristan and since the border on Afghan side was not sealed, the terrorists not only went across but since then are conducting terrorist activities against Pakistan, with impunity, from their safe-havens in Afghanistan, if not under the patronage of NATO/Afghan forces but certainly from areas presently controlled by them.  

In this backdrop, it would be natural for the Pakistani leadership to be apprehensive about USA’s intent behind compelling us to undertake operation in North Waziristan. We must never preclude the possibility that the USA only wants us to attack the militants so that the weakened militants could be pressurized by them into negotiations for extracting a better deal, which may not be in Pakistan’s best interests. Besides, the backlash, if also sponsored by hostile intelligence agencies, would be crippling for Pakistan. As such, Pakistan Army must not undertake this operation unless the border across is sealed by ISAF/US forces and guarantees are given that the retreating militants would not be given safe passage to be used against Pakistan in the future. Also, Pakistan must be included as a party in any future negotiations, overt or covert, with the Taliban.  

Internally, the experience shows that successful military operations in Swat and South Waziristan were not backed by the required political process for seeking permanent solution. The Army still is deployed and committed in these areas. As such, any future military operation must be preceded by shaping of environment for which the political leadership must take full ownership and media should be effectively used to educate the masses. Well planned covert operations must be undertaken to isolate the militants from the locals, though a difficult proposition till the time locals carry the impression that militants are waging ‘jihad’ against foreign forces in Afghanistan. Speedy rehabilitation and initiation of political process after successful military operation are imperatives for a permanent solution, which must be planned in advance. The political leadership must also be fully prepared to deal with any internal fall out of such an operation.

And finally, in the prevailing regional environment, sincerity of purpose is of prime essence. Both Pakistan and USA must learn from the past mistakes, recognize the threat in its larger context, formulate a comprehensive threat response and then appropriately deal with the rogue elements. Double games by USA or Pakistan or both have neither served their interests in the past nor they would in the future – threat is too grave to play around.