Hidden hands behind the Pak-US stand-off? (my article published in THE NEWS on 7 June 2012)

These days, barring PM’s gimmicks related to contempt case, ‘Pak-US relations’ is the most discussed topic in the electronic and print media, with quite a number of journalists and anchorpersons blaming the military establishment for the ongoing stand-off with USA. Though in a democratic dispensation everybody has the right to express his or her views freely, yet we must remain cognizant of the fact that wrong assumptions, and conclusions drawn thereof, may mislead those assigned to formulate policies.

That is exactly what happened when the PCNS, and later the political leadership, sat down to deliberate on future Pak-US relations. Influenced by ‘ideas’ of some of our ‘brains’ who thought it was time to exploit USA’s apparent weaknesses in Afghanistan, they failed to factor-in two important aspects while presenting their demands to the USA; Pakistan’s vulnerabilities and, more importantly, USA’s internal dynamics emanating from ongoing tussle between the two power centres – White House vs the Pentagon / CIA, with profound impact during the election year. Besides, our policy makers also failed to present a unanimous viewpoint on major issues related to Pak-US relations and wasted time on point scoring, a luxury we could ill afford at this critical juncture. The demands, based on wrong conclusions and assumptions were obviously not met and, hence the stand-off.

While our vulnerabilities are well known, in this write-up I will briefly dwell upon USA’s internal dissentions on strategy for Afghanistan, how they are affecting Pak-US relations and what course may be adopted to safeguard our national interests.

President Obama, in keeping with popular slogan during his last election campaign, has already given his exit plan for withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan by 2014. While the State Department is vigorously pursuing this objective, the Pentagon and CIA seem to be following their own agenda, envisaging long-term presence of US forces in the region. In this pursuit, they are not only being supported by the Republicans but also the strong lobbies which exercise profound influence on US policy making. Following lent credence to such a conclusion.    

Though President Obama was not inclined, yet was ‘persuaded’ by Pentagon for induction of 30,000 additional troops in Afghanistan. US military strategists should have known that even after this surge, they would not achieve any worthwhile victory for the simple reason that Taliban do not provide any tangible targets. Why, then, the surge? The only plausible answer is that all along Pentagon nurtured the intentions to provoke Pakistan, having tangible targets, neutralization of which may provide the US military with some semblance of victory.

Attack on Salala Post, as such, was a well planned operation designed to escalate tensions with Pakistan for ensuring long-term deployment of US forces in Afghanistan. By doing so, US military would continue to receive enhanced allocations of over US$100 bn annually and Leon Panetta would secure the patronage of lobbies which are seeking to undermine Pakistan and consider President Obama as an impediment in pursuance of their designs. Panetta has developed political ambitions after successful Operation Geronimo, considers Hillary Clinton as a rival in political arena and seeking to gain edge over her.

Besides attack on Salala Post, other indicators also suggest that Pentagon and CIA, on behest of certain lobbies, are ensuring failure of Obama’s strategy in Afghanistan. While the State Department is endeavouring to bring the Haqqani Network on the negotiation table with Pakistan’s help, they are continuously acting as a spoiler by conducting drone attacks and demanding that Pakistani forces should undertake operations against the Haqqanis.

Then, while the US State Department showed inclination of rendering an apology on Salala incident, it was the military leadership who firmly dispelled any such option.

Recently, US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta gave a statement that charges of US$5000 per container, supposedly demanded by Pakistan, were not acceptable, notwithstanding the fact all told the container charges at this rate would come to slightly over US$ 1 bn annually, nothing compared to over US$100 bn which USA spends for maintaining forces in Afghanistan. Should such a negligible amount be of any consequence if Pentagon was sincere in implementation of President Obama’s exit plan?

Thus, contrary to the perception being developed by some journalists and anchorpersons that GHQ is responsible for the stand-off with USA, actually it’s the Pentagon, supported by CIA, which is acting as a spoiler and dictating terms on Obama and the State Department about strategy to be followed vis-a-vis Pakistan and Afghanistan.

That be the case, if President Obama is sincere in defusing tensions with Pakistan and implement his exit plan, he must recognize the problems within, muster up the courage to rein-in the military / CIA and let the State Department deal with the contentious issues. In short, he must start to assert.

As for the Pakistani leadership, they must have clear understanding of the evolving situation, wash-off misplaced notion of relevance and shun arrogance, emanating from ignorance, to ensure formulation and implementation of a viable strategy vis-a-vis USA. National interest rather than seeking a few hundred US dollars should be the guiding principle, as the latter would mean nothing for a country which loses Rs 5bn daily due to corruption as per DG NAB’s recent statement.

In this regard, despite many hiccups, I see a commonality of interest between President Obama, Pakistan and the Taliban on a singular agenda point – withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan by 2014. To ensure sincerity of purpose by all stake holders, Pakistan may even undertake a diplomatic initiative involving international powers, stakeholders and UN to seek commitments from USA on implementation of its exit plan.

At our end, all needed support must be provided  for ensuring smooth withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, may it be opening of GLOC and convincing Taliban / Haqqanis to negotiate with USA, as any hindrance, actual or perceived, would tantamount to serving the cause of Pentagon, CIA, and anti-Pakistan lobbies. If they are bent upon pursuing a confrontationist course against Pakistan, why must we fall into their trap and provide them with the excuse.  

Even if no assurances are provided by USA about implementation of their exit plan, I see no sense in getting on the left side of extra regional forces which are likely to remain in our immediate neighbourhood for some time to come, as long as the red lines are clear to both the sides.

Defining moment in Pak-US relations (My article published in THE NEWS on 24 Mar 2012)

Since Pakistan’s inception, military establishment has been playing a deciding role in the formulation of our foreign policy and strategic options vis-à-vis USA. After 9/11, the strategy, which we followed till recently, was formulated by a military dictator, under duress and, probably, motivated by self-interest. It was bound to failure as it over-looked the divergence of interests of the two countries in the region and the logical result was the disaster, as manifested in 2^nd May 2011 and Salala Check-Post incidents. Fortunately, as a welcome change, this time, the Parliamentary Committee for National Security has deliberated at length and presented proposals defining the contours and parameters of our future relations with USA and these are presently under discussion in the Parliament. While, I am sure, our worthy parliamentarians would come out with viable solutions, in-keeping with our national aspirations, as well as the ground realities, they must remain cognizant of a few underlying factors.

First and foremost, the parliamentarians must clearly understand the dynamics of the threats faced by Pakistan, both internal and external, our capability to counter these threats and implications, thereof, in the shaped environment, whereby, Pakistan, today, is isolated and seen as a threat to world peace. INTERNALLY, IN MY VIEW, PAKISTAN, LIKE A HIGH VELOCITY MISSILE PRIMED FOR SELF-DESTRUCTION, IS HEADING FOR A STRATEGIC DISASTER IN DIFFERENT SPHERES - POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, INSTITUTIONAL – AND UNLESS CHANGE FOR THE BETTERMENT IS BROUGHT FROM WITHIN, IT IS LIKELY TO EXPLODE. The prevailing and developing regional scenarios present many opportunities for Pakistan and the opposition must not try to play to the gallery and resort to point scoring on this important issue of our national interest.

Secondly, it’s a fact that our leaders have been exploiting our negative potential (potential of destabilization) for quite some time for pursuing personal agendas and the world at large is now not willing to give further concessions on this account. Our positive potentials because of our geo-strategic location and capacity to influence events in Afghanistan give us a lot of leverage to negotiate with USA, which must be used for the benefit of the masses.  Thirdly, in my view, there is no doubt that owing to divergence of interests, both USA and Pakistan have been playing double games with each other, however, neither has benefited from the strategy followed hitherto. There is, thus, a need to revisit these strategies by both and bring in transparency in their relationship. Fourthly, we must keep in mind that the US leadership finds a commonality of interests with India for pursuance of their long term objectives in the region and, thus, have formed a Nexus with them. The strategy we now formulate must aim at tackling this nexus and minimizing its negative impact on Pakistan. Fifthly, we must learn from the dismemberment of erstwhile USSR that use of Low Intensity Conflict as an instrument is the best strategy to subdue a nuclear state. Our negative internal dynamics which lent us extremely vulnerable to this kind of warfare and the fact that our neighbour in the East is inclined to pursue an indirect approach to convert Pakistan into a pliant state, countering such pursuits should remain one of the prime objectives of our foreign policy vis-à-vis USA for which we may have to compromise on certain issues. And lastly, notwithstanding commitments by the US leadership that their forces would be withdrawn from Afghanistan by 2014, they are likely to maintain their presence in the country and, as such, require a corridor or a supply line via Pakistan to support their bases. THEREFORE, OUR NEW STRATEGY VIS-À-VIS USA MUST TAKE INTO COGNIZANCE THE IMPLICATIONS OF LONG-TERM USA’S PRESENCE IN THE REGION.

While the PCNS has deliberately covered most of the aspects that impact Pak-US relations and forwarded viable proposals, somehow, the loop-holes left in some of the proposed recommendations and absence of a clear-cut response to breaches by USA, give the impression that these have been prepared with USA’s understanding, that already a deal has been struck with the US authorities as to which of these would be implemented and that the whole exercise is for public consumption. This is where the opposition can play an effective role by ensuring that the final recommendations are doable, put in black and white with no ambiguity on the response to any future breaches of accepted clauses and  a few also need rethinking and inclusion;

(1) When we seek transparency in presence of foreign spies, we indirectly admit that they would be acceptable if the conditions are met – a breach of our sovereignty. Why must we permit foreign spies?

(2) Similarly, the proposal that the use of bases or airspace by foreign forces would be permitted after parliament’s approval, indirectly indicates the possibility for providing such bases to USA in future, for which clear-cut terms and conditions should be defined.

(3) While proposal to levy taxes on US supplies is logical, the amount we are likely to fetch (approximately US$1million a day, as reported in the press) is peanuts as compared to what the Americans are spending for supporting their forces in Afghanistan. We need to get the right price for our co-operation, if we decide so open the NATO supplies. Let not the individuals be benefited as hitherto.

(4) WHILE DRONE ATTACKS DO IMPINGE ON OUR SOVEREIGNTY, THE PAKISTANI OR FOREIGN MILITANTS WHO GO ACROSS INTO AFGHANISTAN AND HIT US/NATO/AFGHAN FORCES ALSO BREACH THEIR SOVEREIGNTY. IF PAKISTAN CANNOT STOP THESE MILITANTS FROM GOING ACROSS WHO, NATURALLY, DO NOT RECOGNIZE ANY BORDERS, HOW CAN IT JUSTIFY ITS STANCE OF CONDEMNING DRONE ATTACKS ACROSS THIS SIDE OF THE BORDER? THIS INTRICACY HAS TO BE RESOLVED FOR A VIABLE SOLUTION TO THE ISSUE.

(5) USA is unlikely to accept the proposal of an India like civil nuclear deal with Pakistan. Instead, we should demand Pakistan’s recognition as a nuclear state with the right to seek similar deals with other nuclear powers.

(6) Surprisingly, there is no mention of what role USA should play in solving Kashmir dispute, Pakistan’s role in the future dispensation in Afghanistan and interference in Balochistan. These need to be incorporated.    

Hopefully, with the loop-holes in the proposed recommendations plugged, we are likely to formulate a viable strategy vis-à-vis USA which is based on realism, but reflective of our public sentiment, and in keeping with our national interests.